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THE STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES IN AMERICAN
LAW TODAY*
Honorable William C. Canby, Jr.**
In describing the subject of my lecture to Dean Fletcher of this law
school, I said that it would deal with two questions: Are the fundamental
assumptions underlying the special status of Indian tribes changing? If so,
what will be the effect of those changes?
I considered simply saying that the answer to the first question is "no"
and that the answer to the second question is therefore "none." It would
make a mercifully short lecture. Unfortunately, however, my review of
legal developments over the past several years, particularly the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, convinces me that at least some of the
fundamental assumptions underlying federal Indian law are changing, and
that those changes are having and will continue to have substantial effects.
At the outset, I think it best to state the perspective from which my
remarks are made. This perspective accepts the validity of our national
Indian policy as established by Congress' and recently endorsed by President Reagan. 2 That policy assumes the permanence of the Indian tribes as
self-governing entities, and encourages tribal autonomy and development.
Indeed, if one does not accept the continuing viability of the tribes, much of
what we call federal Indian law will not make sense.
Half a dozen years ago, at the risk of considerable oversimplification, I
suggested four persistent themes that formed the doctrinal bases of federal
Indian law. 3 First, the tribes are sovereign entities with inherent powers of
self-government. Second, the sovereignty of the tribes is subject to exceptionally great powers of Congress to regulate and modify the status of the
tribes. Third, the power to deal with and regulate the tribes is wholly
federal; the states are excluded unless Congress delegates power to them.
* This lecture was presented as the 1986 Jurisprudential Lecture, sponsored by the University of
Washington School of Law and the Washington Law Review and made possible by a grant from the
Evans Bunker Memorial Fund.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The opinions expressed
herein are individual ones of the author as a student and former teacher ofIndian Law. They represent no
official position, either of the author or of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1985);
Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451-1543 (1985).
2. President Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 98 (Jan. 24 1983);
see also 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970) (statement by President Nixon on Indian Policy).
3. NV.CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 2 (West Nutshell Series 1981).
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Fourth, the federal government has a responsibility to protect the tribes and
their properties, including the responsibility to protect them from encroachments by the states and their citizens.
Even at the time I made this list, the Supreme Court was evolving
doctrines that have since modified some of these propositions. Subsequent
decisions have accelerated the process. Today, the tribes are still sovereign
with inherent powers of self-government, but the Supreme Court no longer
regards that fact as central to the resolution of disputes between the tribes
and the states. Congressional power to alter the status of the tribes remains
plenary; there has been no change there. The third proposition-that the
states are wholly excluded from dealing with the tribes unless Congress
delegates the power to them-can no longer be safely relied upon. Finally,
the federal government still has a responsibility to protect the tribes, but the
level of protection from state intrusion is considerably lower than it was just
a few years ago.
In order to understand how these changes occurred, and what they mean,
we must take a brief look at the historical foundations of federal Indian law.
In Indian law, perhaps more than in any other legal subject, we cannot
understand where we are going without knowing where we have been.
I.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: EXCLUSION OF THE
STATES FROM POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS

In colonial days, the British Crown and several of its colonies dealt with
the Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign nations. Increasingly, the
Crown took control of relations with the tribes, because the excesses of the
colonists threatened to trigger Indian wars that the Crown would be
required to fight. After independence, the federal government assumed
responsibility for dealing with the Indian tribes for exactly the same reason:
the new national government feared that the states and their citizens would
deal unfairly with the Indians and that Indian wars would result.
As the tribes became encompassed by the surrounding United States, the
question of their legal status arose during a series of conflicts between the
tribes and their non-Indian neighbors. The most notable of these gave rise
to the Cherokee Cases in which Chief Justice John Marshall described the
status of the Indian tribes in a manner that was to dominate the field of
federal Indian law ever after. The Cherokee Cases arose from the the State
of Georgia's attempts to obliterate the political and territorial structure of
the Cherokees. In the first case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 the Cherokees tried to establish that they were a "foreign state" in order to bring an
action against Georgia in federal court.
4.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Chief Justice Marshall easily accepted the argument that the Cherokees
a distinct political society, separated from others,
were "a state, ...
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself. . . . He could
not accept, however, the proposition that the Cherokees were aforeignstate
and so made his famous characterization of Indian tribes as "domestic,
dependent nations." 6 The consequences of Marshall's characterizations of
the Cherokees as a state, but also as a domestic dependent nation, were at
least three. As a state, the Cherokees possessed inherent powers of government. As a domestic dependent nation, they were subject to two limitations
on the power that might otherwise be exercised by wholly independent
sovereigns: they could not alienate their land except to the federal government, 7 and they could not engage in relations with other foreign powers.
Marshall strengthened and elaborated upon his views one year later in
Worcester v. Georgia.8 That case was an appeal by two missionaries who
had been convicted of violating a Georgia law requiring non-Indians
residing in Cherokee territory to obtain a license from the state. After an
extensive review of colonial history and the applicable treaties, Chief
Justice Marshall summed up:
"5

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United
States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. 9
By the time of the Cherokee Cases, then, all four of the principles that
form the basis of federal Indian law had been quite firmly established.
Marshall's language in Worcester leaves no doubt that the tribes are
sovereign entities with inherent powers of self-government, and that the
only power entitled to deal with the tribes is federal; states are wholly
excluded. The federal government's responsibility to protect the tribes
from the states and their citizens was also explicitly recognized. 10 Finally,
5. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
6. Id. at 17.
7. This limitation had been established by Chief Justice Marshall in the earlier case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
10. The dangers from which the tribes needed protection were well expressed fifty years later. The
tribes "owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill
feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
United States v. Kagama,
weakness and helplessness. . . there arises the duty of protection.
118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 62:1, 1987

the power of Congress to regulate and modify the status of the tribes was
implicit in, if not the focus of, the Cherokee Cases.
A key question ever since the Cherokee Cases has been the extent of
sovereignty of the tribes. To what subjects and what persons does their
inherent power to govern extend? Worcester leaves little question that in
Marshall's view, the tribes were inherently empowered to govern everything that happened within their territories. The boundaries of tribal power
were essentially geographical; the laws of Georgia could not extend into
Cherokee territory. It is important that Worcester involved the status of a
non-Indian in Cherokee country. The laws of Georgia could have no force
even upon him. The only restrictions on the power of the Cherokee Nation
arising from its domestic dependent status were the two that Marshall had
previously recognized: the tribes could not treat with foreign powers, and
the tribes could not alienate their land to parties other than the federal
government.
Marshall's tidy view that state law and power could not extend into
Indian country prevailed for nearly fifty years. The jurisdictional picture
was then greatly clouded by United States v. McBratney. II That brief
decision held that the State of Colorado, rather than the federal government, had jurisdiction over a murder committed by a non-Indian upon a
non-Indian within the Ute reservation in Colorado. The Court noted that the
Ute treaty did not deal with such crimes. It therefore held that "Colorado,
by its admission into the Union by Congress, upon an equal footing with
the original states . . . acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens
and other white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its
limits, including the Ute reservation." 12 McBratney was followed fifteen
years later by Draper v. United States, 13 which applied the same rule in
Montana, despite a provision of Montana's statehood enabling act requir4
ing Montana to disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands. 1
One suspects that the Court's decisions in McBratney and Drapercaused
very little commotion at the time. After all, the Indian tribes probably had
very little interest in dealing with crimes involving only non-Indians when
their occurrence on the reservation was largely a matter of chance. Indeed,
the question was not whether the tribe should take any part in the punishment, but merely whether the United States or the state should. Had the
I1.
104 U.S 621 (1882).
12. McBratne', 104 U.S. at 624.
13. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
14. 25 STAT. 676,677 (1889). The Court held that jurisdiction over lands did not necessarily refer to
jurisdiction to punish offenses committed on those lands. It also said that equality of statehood was the
rule and that any words relied upon to create an exception would have to be quite unambiguous. Draper.
164 U.S. at 244-45. See also infra text preceding note 15.
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United States done so," it would have been acting in its regular role as
guarantor of the tribe against incursions by non-Indians.
McBratney and Draper,however, had a profound effect on the original
scheme envisaged by Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee Cases. For
Marshall, the division of power between state and tribe was purely territorial. McBratney and Draper niade it impossible thereafter to decide
such questions of jurisdiction in simple geographical fashion. Georgia was
one of the original states, and its laws were held by Marshall to have no
force in Cherokee territory. McBratney and Draper permitted Colorado
and Montana law to have force within Indian country on the principle that
their admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original states
justified the application of their law throughout the state, including Indian
country, if Indian interests were not affected. The territorial test was
replaced by something much more vague-the "interest" of the tribe in the
transaction that was subject to criminal enforcement or regulation. Moreover, the sovereign interest of the state was to be taken into account, so long
as no interest of the tribe was affected.
The next significant case exploring problems of jurisdiction in light of
tribal interests was the 1959 decision of Williams v. Lee, 15 which has served
as the foundation of much federal Indian law during the past twenty-five
years. In Williams, a non-Indian who was a licensed trader attempted to sue
an Indian customer in state court to recover the purchase price of goods sold
to the customer on the Navajo reservation. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Black, held that the state court had no jurisdiction.
Justice Black drew upon the Cherokee Cases, acknowledging that though
there had been some modification of Marshall's principles "in cases where
essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians
would not be jeopardized . . . the basic policy of Worcester has remained." 16 In his much-quoted ruling, Justice Black stated: "Essentially,
absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them. "17 Justice Black then went on to hold that
to allow the state court to exercise jurisdiction
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It
is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and
the transaction with an Indian took place there. . . . The cases in this Court

15.
16.
17.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.
Id. at 220.
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have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
reservations. 18
The test of Williams v. Lee-whether a state action infringes on "the
right of Reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them"-would not have been very protective of tribal authority if the area
of tribal self-government had been narrowly viewed. But the domain of
tribal self-government was viewed very expansively in Williams and its
progeny. When tribal interests, broadly viewed, were affected, the state
was excluded. Matters had not changed greatly since the Cherokee Cases.
II.

SHIFTS IN THE HISTORICAL BALANCE: STATE INTERESTS
BEGIN TO INTRUDE INTO INDIAN AFFAIRS

A.

Preemption Analysis

The beginning of the major changes that affect the status of Indian tribes
in American law today came in 1973, in McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax
Commission. 19 In McClanahan, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the State of Arizona could not impose an income tax on the income a
Navajo earned on the reservation. This result is not at all surprising. What is
notable is the route the Court traveled to reach it. Justice Thurgood
Marshall, writing for the majority, simply could have ruled that the tax,
imposed upon an Indian in Indian country, interfered with the tribe's selfgovernment-its sovereign interests. Instead, the Court took a different
approach to sovereignty. Although Justice Marshall discussed the Cherokee Cases, he pointed out that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty had
undergone considerable evolution since John Marshall's day.
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a
bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption. ...
The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power. ...
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be

read. 20
The Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, then analyzed the treaties
and statutes and held that Arizona's income tax was preempted.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 223.
411U.S. 164 (1973).
Id. at 172.
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The McClanahanresult was highly protective of tribal self-government,
and one suspects that Chief Justice Marshall, had he been alive when
McClanahan was decided, would have happily accepted it. But McClanahan contained the seeds of enormous change. By reducing sovereignty to a backdrop and relying on the preemptive effect of federal
treaties and statutes, it reversed the fundamental presumption of inherent
tribal power applicable to disputes between tribes and states.
If one starts from a proposition of inherent tribal sovereignty and power,
as I have, one assumes the power of the tribe to deal with anything falling
within its territorial jurisdiction. The inquiry is only whether Congress has
curtailed this power. If not, the tribe's power exists and excludes the state
from operating on the same subject.
A preemption analysis poses a different question: has any federal treaty
or statute preempted state power and thus buttressed the sovereignty of the
tribe? Because that is the question, the beginning assumption must be that
the state does have the power to apply its law unless preempted. And in
Indian law, as in many other areas, where the courts end up depends upon
where they start. Justice Thurgood Marshall himself always applies his
preemption analysis with great sensitivity to the "backdrop" of tribal
sovereignty, but it is probably fair to say that he does that in spite of, rather
than because of, the preemption doctrine he announced in McClanahan.
Another characteristic of preemption analysis should be mentioned: it is
extremely fact-specific. Whether a state law is preempted depends upon the
particular treaties and statutes that apply, and upon the particular state and
tribal interests asserted in the situation in question. As a consequence,
results are unpredictable. Chief Justice Marshall's rule that the laws of
Georgia could have no force in Indian country may have been a platonic
notion, but it was a clear principle with predictable results. Not so with
preemption.
B.

"Inherent" Limits on Tribal Power Arising From Their Domestic
Dependent Status

Another doctrinal threat to the traditional scope of Indian sovereignty
became most clearly apparent in 1978 when the Supreme Court decided
Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe.21 Oliphantis an extremely important
case, both in its own right and for the purpose of assessing the changing
foundations of federal Indian law. The issue in Oliphantwas a simple one:
can a tribe arrest and try a non-Indian for a violation of tribal law occurring
on the tribe's reservation? Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion referred to
21.

435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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a number of treaties and federal statutes that seemed to have assumed, over
the course of the last 200 years, that the tribes did not have the power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. If the opinion had found
that any of these treaties or statutes had explicitly or implicitly deprived the
tribes of such jurisdiction, the decision would not be a particularly remarkable one. But Justice Rehnquist recognized that none of the treaties or
statutes had that operative effect. The problem was approached from quite a

different angle.
The tribe frankly acknowledged that no treaty or statute gave it power to
try non-Indians. Its argument was that the power to try any person for a
crime committed within the tribe's territory was an inherent aspect of
sovereignty. The power need not be conferred by any federal statute or
treaty; it existed absent a showing that federal statute or treaty had taken it

away. The tribe's argument was squarely in line with the view of inherent
sovereign power espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall in the Cherokee
Cases. A majority of the Court in Oliphant, however, viewed sovereignty
quite differently.
The majority first said that Indian law was drawn primarily from treaties
and statutes which must be interpreted in light of the assumptions of those
who drafted them. The majority then held that, when viewed against the
backdrop of treaties and statutes, the tribe's power to try non-Indians was
lost upon the tribe's incorporation into the United States. For the first time
in 150 years, there was an expansion of the list of tribal powers held to be
inconsistent with the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations.
Chief Justice Marshall had recognized only two limitations: the tribes
could not convey their land to anyone other than United States, and the
tribes could not treat with foreign powers. So why did the Court in Oliphant
find the power to punish non-Indian offenders inconsistent with the status
of the tribes? Because, the Court said, the United States was as interested in
protecting its citizens from "unwarranted intrusions on their personal

liberty"

22

as it was in protecting its territories.

I suggest that it is far from self-evident that incorporation of tribes into
the United States deprives them of power to govern their own territories and

to punish crimes against the tribe. Admittedly the Court's majority can
draw support from congressional statements that there was really no
effective system of tribal criminal jurisdiction at the time most of the tribes
were incorporated into the United States. Accurate or not, the statements
were made. But in modern terms, Oliphant's concern may have been
misguided. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 196823 gave all persons, not just
22.

Id. at 210.

23.

25 U.S.C. § 1301 passim (1985): see also infra text accompanying notes 26 and 27.
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Indians, the basic Bill of Rights protections against arbitrary tribal action.
The Indian Civil Rights Act affords nearly all of the due process protections
to persons in tribal court that exist in state court, with one exception: an
indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to counsel at government expense. While that deficiency is potentially a serious one, it is not immediately apparent why it is more serious for non-Indians than for Indians.
The deficiency is also limited somewhat by the statute's restriction of tribal
court jurisdiction to maximum sentences of six months in prison or five
24
hundred dollars fine.
Oliphant poses an enormous potential threat to the power of the tribes,
because it permits the fashioning of new limitations on tribal power by the
Court itself. Congress has always had power to limit tribal sovereignty, but
Oliphant invites the Court to discover additional limitations that are inherent in the status of the tribes.
This potential effect of Oliphant was greatly enhanced last year in
NationalFarmersUnion InsuranceCo. v. Crow Tribe of Indians.25 There, a
tribal court had rendered a default judgment against a non-Indian insurance
company. The company came to federal court and claimed that the tribe
lacked inherent power to enter a civil judgment against the company. The
issue was whether the federal court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim as
one arising under federal law. The Supreme Court held that limitations on
tribal authority were a matter of federal law, and made it clear that this was
so whether the limitation arose from treaty, statute, or the status of the tribe
as a domestic dependent nation. The company's case was therefore one
arising under federal law, and was properly brought in federal court under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. As a result of this ruling, anyone asserting a new
limitation on tribal power under the Oliphant theory has a clear path into
federal court, at least after exhausting tribal remedies.
C. JudicialLimitations on Tribal Power ContrastedWith
CongressionalLimitations
This ease of entry into federal court contrasts strangely with the limitations to federal court access imposed by the Supreme Court on persons
claiming a tribal violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. That Act
was a fairly belated congressional reaction to the fact that the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights do not restrict the actions of Indian tribes. 26 The Indian
Civil Rights Act requires the tribes to honor the guarantees of free exercise,
24.
25.
26.

25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985).
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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freedom of speech and press and assembly, due process and equal protection, freedom from unreasonable search, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishments, and similar protections. 27 The Act
also provides for a remedy of habeas corpus in federal court.
Not surprisingly, numbers of lower federal courts had implied remedies
for violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act by tribes. Habeas is obviously
not an effective remedy for an expropriation of property, or for denials of
equal protection that occur outside of the criminal context. Nevertheless, in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez28 the Act received a rather surprising
interpretation. The Supreme Court held that habeas was the exclusive
remedy, thereby throwing Mrs. Martinez and her noncriminal equal protection claim out of federal court. The Court based its ruling on the ground
that implied remedies would constitute too great an interference with tribal
autonomy and self-government. There are times when it is impossible to
believe that Martinez was decided by the same court that, only two months
earlier, decided Oliphant.
An excellent case can be made for the proposition that, in light of the
traditional bases of federal Indian law and the current practical situation,
both Oliphant and Martinez were wrongly decided. One of the undercurrents in Oliphant is that the tribes cannot be trusted to dispense justice
fairly. But taking non-Indians out of that system does not remedy the
problem for the Indians who remain in it. Moreover, there is clearly a
habeas remedy for non-Indians who claim that tribal courts trampled upon
their rights in a criminal trial. Indeed, habeas is the route by which
Oliphant got into federal court.
Martinez, on the other hand, dealt with an exercise of congressional
power that, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, was obviously aimed at
limiting tribal sovereignty. As a result of the Court's decision, federal
substantive standards are imposed on the tribes, but a violation, other than
in the criminal area, is not reviewable by any federal court, including the
Supreme Court.
What we are left with after Oliphant and Martinez is that tribal power
may be limited when the federal courts find, under a vague formula, that the
tribes are attempting to do something that is "inherently inconsistent with"
the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations. On the other hand,
the far more specific congressionally mandated guarantees of the Indian
Civil Rights Act are largely denied enforcement in federal court. Congress,
with full power to limit Indian sovereignty, is held to have limited it very
little, while the Court itself is free to discover additional limits.
27.
28.

25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1985).
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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III.

CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINES LIMITING
TRIBAL INDEPENDENCE FROM STATE POWER

We have, then, two doctrinal changes that now give the Supreme Court at
least the opportunity to alter its traditional approach to federal Indian law:
(1) the change from an emphasis on tribal sovereign power to a preemption
analysis in order to determine whether state law can intrude; and (2) the
discovery of new limitations on tribal powers because of the tribes' domestic dependent status-along with federal court jurisdiction to impose those
limits. A review of some recent Supreme Court decisions indicates that
both doctrinal tools are being used to shift the balance between tribal and
state power, although the trend of decisions is by no means constant or
uninterrupted.
A.

Preemption Analysis

The Court's new approaches do not protect the tribes from the intrusions
of the states as thoroughly as did the old ones. But the Court's thrust has not
been all in one direction. When the tribes' own power to tax reservation
activities has been in issue, the Court has invoked the sovereign power of
the tribes to uphold the tribes' taxing power, even though it fell upon nonIndians. 29 Even when the issue has been one of a state's power to apply its
laws in Indian country, several decisions, almost all written by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, have protected the tribes despite the fact that a preemption approach was used. Justice Marshall has written three opinions for the
Court which held that states were preempted from imposing their taxes on
non-Indians performing contracts or selling equipment to tribes in Indian
country. 30 In doing so, Justice Marshall has emphasized that "the unique
historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply
to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes, those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of law."31 He has also made it
clear that the preemption by federal law need not be explicit. 32 Despite
these tribal protections, however, it is clear that even Justice Marshall's
approach comes down to a weighing of competing state and tribal interests.
This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state
or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature
29. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indians Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 195 (1985).
30. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona StateTax Comm'n,
448 U.S. 160 (1980).
31. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
32. Id. at 150-51.
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of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
33
would violate federal law.

This process of weighing and balancing interests is quite different from
merely asking, as Williams v. Lee did, whether a proposed state action
intrudes on Indian self-government. Although Justice Marshall recognizes
that when only Indians are involved, the state is likely to have a small
interest, 34 he still clearly suggests that a weighing and balancing of interests
could occur. It is therefore possible that state intrusion will be permitted,
even when Indian interests alone are involved, so long as the state has a very
high interest supporting its intrusion, and the tribe's interest in resisting is
not correspondingly strong. 35 We have come a long way from the Cherokee
Cases.

Justice Marshall's balancing approach is also quite explicit in one final
recent case in which he uses preemption analysis to preclude state regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing on an Indian reservation. In New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe36 the Mescalero Tribe, in cooperation
with the federal government, had engaged in an extensive fish and wildlife
conservation program. The tribe regulated hunting and fishing by both
members and nonmembers. New Mexico conceded the right of the tribe to
regulate both groups on-reservation but contended that it, too, had the
power to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation.
The Supreme Court, again speaking through Justice Marshall, held that the
state regulations aimed at nonmembers were preempted by federal law. As
usual, Justice Marshall gave deference to the notions of tribal sovereignty
that inform his preemption analysis. He continued to emphasize, however,
that present preemption analysis entails balancing state and tribal and
federal interests. Justice Marshall stated:
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Moreover, in the latest of the three tax decisions, Ramah v. Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau
of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected a more protective standard urged
by the Solicitor General. In an aniicus brief, the Solicitor General argued that the court should modify
its preemption analysis and rely instead on the dormant Indian commerce clause, article I, section 8.
clause 3, "to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident Tribe are presumptively beyond the
reach of state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the burden on
the State to demonstrate that its intrusion is either condoned by Congress or justified by a compelling
need to protect legitimate, specified state interests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue. "
ld. at 845. Justice Marshall and a majority of the Court declined the invitation. The Solicitor General's
proposal emphasizes. however, some of the potential deficiencies of a preemption analysis. It endangers
tribal authority when federal regulation is slight, even though the absence of that regulation may stem
from a desire to encourage tribal self-sufficiency and independence. See Pelcyger, JusticesandIndians:
Back to Basics, 62 OR L. REv. 29, 33-34 & n.34 (1983).
36. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law,
unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state
authority.

37

This formulation makes explicit that which had only been implicit before:
state authority could substantially interfere with tribal and even federal
interests when the state's interests at stake are high and immediate. While
state interests could not override an express federal preemption, the federal
government rarely preempts state law expressly.
It is now time to turn to three recent Supreme Court decisions that
illustrate how preemption analysis, with its reduced emphasis on inherent
tribal sovereignty, can lead to expansions of state authority into Indian
country, and to corresponding reductions in the powers of tribal government.
The first case is Washington v. ConfederatedTribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation.38 In Colville, both the State of Washington and the Colville
Indian Tribe were attempting to tax cigarette sales to nonmembers on the
reservation. In an earlier case, 39 the Court had held that a state could tax
sales of cigarettes to non-Indians, and could even require the Indian tribal
seller to collect the tax and remit it to the state. In response to that ruling,
the Colville Tribes had imposed their own tax on cigarette sales (a lower
one than the state tax) and then argued that the tribal tax should preempt the
state tax. The Court unanimously rejected the Tribes' arguments that the
state taxes were (1) preempted by federal statutes; (2) inconsistent with
invalid under the negative implications of
tribal self-government; and (3)
40
the Indian commerce clause.
The Court's weighing and balancing was clearly an economic matter.
The tribes argued that most of the cigarette sellers' business depended upon
maintaining a lower total price than sellers off-reservation. The Supreme
Court said that it was apparent that the "value marketed" 41 by the tribal
smoke shops was not generated on the reservations, and that the tribes were
simply marketing a tax exemption to purchasers off-reservation. These
facts enhanced the state's interest and minimized the tribal interestviewed as one of self-government. The Court also held that no federal
statutes, however broadly read, preempted Washington's tax laws and that
the Indian commerce clause at most barred only discrimination against or
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334.
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
Colville, 447 U.S. 155-77 (White, J., writing for the majority).
Id. at 155. The "value" is freedom from state tax for cigarettes consumed.
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undue burdens on Indian commerce. The Indian commerce clause did not
preclude nondiscriminatory taxing.
The Colville majority also held that the State of Washington need not
give tax credits for the amount of tribal taxes paid. The Court stated that the
tribes had failed to demonstrate that business would be significantly reduced by a state tax without such credit as compared to a state tax with a
credit. The Court also upheld Washington's collection and record keeping
requirements for tribal smoke shops.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in part, contending that the
application of state tax law would interfere with tribal revenues and tribal
economic development encouraged by the federal government. These
justices found that the state's failure to grant a credit for tribal taxes was a
particularly glaring deficiency of the state's tax scheme.4 2 The lack of tax
credit does seem to subject tribal commerce to burdens greater than that
which other commerce must bear.
Justice Rehnquist also wrote a separate opinion stating with considerable
clarity his view of preemption analysis.
I see no need for this Court to balance the state and tribal interests in enacting
particular forms of taxation in order to determine their validity. . . . Absent
discrimination, the question is only one of congressional intent. Either
Congress intended to pre-empt the state taxing authority or it did not.
Balancing of interests is not the appropriate gauge for determining validity
43
since it is that very balancing which we have reserved to Congress.
Justice Rehnquist then found no such preemption. Perhaps central to
Justice Rehnquist's view is his comment that "[a]t issue here is not only
Indian sovereignty, but necessarily state sovereignty as well."44 Another
central theme of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that, in the absence of an
immunity expressly conferred by Congress, a tribe was immune from state
taxation only when there was a tradition placing the particular activities of
the tribe beyond the reach of state taxation. Justice Rehnquist found no such
tradition in Colville.
Why does Colville signify a change in Indian law direction? It does so
because the very act of balancing the economic interests of the tribe against
those of the state presumes the legitimacy of regulation by both entities, not
only in Indian country, but in activities in which the tribe is interested and
affected. Of course, John Marshall's original view that state law simply
could not cross the reservation boundary has been modified. But until this
decade it was still assumed that the standard of Williams v. Lee precluded
42.
43.
44

Id. at 172.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 181.
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the state from intruding on the tribe's conduct of its own affairs. There was
no explicit balancing; the inquiry was simply whether the tribal interests
were interfered with. If so, state law could not be applied, no matter what
the interest underlying it. But once the Court itself engages in a balancing
of interest, intrusions on previously protected tribal authority are almost
inevitable. True, the tribe might and the Mescaleros did later win the
balancing contest with regard to game regulation in New Mexico, but that is
no guarantee that balancing will favor tribal interest in future cases.
Colville, in my view, is the first major case where the balancing comes out
in favor of the state.
B.- Inherent Limitations of Tribal Power Arising From Domestic
Dependent Status
A case that illustrates another doctrinal device to limit tribal power is
Montanav. United States,45 decided a year after Colville. One issue in that
case was the tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on
non-Indian-owned lands within the reservation. The court of appeals had
upheld that power as incident to the tribe's inherent sovereignty, but the
Supreme Court rejected that view. It resorted to the doctrine of implicit
limitation on sovereign power arising from the status of the tribes as
domestic dependent nations. It adopted a quite narrow view of the sovereignty retained by the tribes. The Court stated that
exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation. . . . Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of
the tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to
tribal self-government or internal relations, the general principles of retained
inherent sovereignty did not authorize the Crow Tribe [to regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing on non-Indian land within the reservation] .46
The Court also stated that the Crow Tribe had traditionally accommodated
itself to the state's regulation of such hunting and fishing on fee lands within
the reservation.
I suggest that Montana represents a significant limitation of tribal
authority by use of the newly invigorated doctrine that there are various
functions inherently inconsistent with the status of tribes as domestic
dependent nations. Having revived the doctrine in Oliphant,the Court here
expands it to a purely civil regulation of non-Indian activity within the
45. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
46. Montana. 450 U.S. at 564-65.
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reservation. From the original notion that a tribe lost its power over external
(i.e., foreign) relations upon being surrounded by and subject to the United
States, the Court has moved to the position that regulation of non-Indian
activity within the reservation is somehow external to tribal self-government. The tribe's loss of power is not to the federal government, upon
which the tribe is dependent, but to the state. It may be. of course, that a
different tribe in another case could establish that non-Indian hunting and
fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation had a great impact on the
fish and game resources of the tribe itself, especially if both fish and game
move on and off of the fee lands. 47 Nevertheless, Montana shows the
potential open-endedness of the Court's new willingness to find limitations
of tribal power arising from the tribe's domestic dependent status. Montana
comes very close to placing the burden on the tribe of showing why its selfgovernment interests are affected sufficiently to support the regulation.
C.

Preemption and Inherent Limitation DoctrinesApplied Together:
Rice v. Rehner

The most extreme applications of both the preemption doctrine and the
domestic dependent nation doctrine to limit tribal authority appear in the
recent case of Rice v. Rehner.48 This case has several surprising and even
puzzling aspects. The issue was whether the State of California could
require a federally licensed Indian trader, a tribal member who operated a
liquor store on an Indian reservation, to obtain a state liquor license. The
tribe had adopted an ordinance permitting the sale of liquor, as long as the
sales conformed to substantive state law. This ordinance had been approved
by the Secretary of the Interior. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1161, made
such sales legal under the federal law if they were "in conformity both with
the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of
Indian country." 49 Against this background, the Supreme Court held that
the state could require the license. The Court's conclusion that section 1161
supported the application of state licensing laws is not remarkable, although reasonable persons could differ on that issue. What is surprising is
the Court's remaining rationale for its decision. After reciting the often
repeated background of tribal sovereignty, the Court stated:
47. The Court in Montana noted that -[a) tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.- Id. at 566.
48. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
49
18 U.S C. § 1161 (1984).
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When we determine that tradition has recognized a sovereign immunity in
favor of the Indians in some respect, then we usually are reluctant to infer that
Congress has authorized the assertion of state authority in that respect
"except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply."
[citing McClanahan]. Repeal by implication of an established tradition of
immunity, or self-governance is disfavored. .

.

.If, however, we do not find

such a tradition or if we determine that the balance of state, federal and tribal
interests so requires, our pre-emption analysis may accord less weight to the
"backdrop" of tribal sovereignty. 50
Justice Rehnquist's separate view in Colville, that tradition is important in
determining whether state law is preempted, has thus found its way into a
majority opinion. But when Justice Rehnquist referred to the traditional
immunity of the tribes, he was differentiating between the tribes' activities
on the reservation, which were traditionally immune from taxation, and
activities of non-Indians or of Indians off-reservation or even tribes offreservation, 5 1 which are not traditionally exempt from state taxation. The
issue in Rice v. Rehner, however, is the state's jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of liquor on the reservation by an Indian trader who is a member of the
tribe. To find such power in the state it is not essential to find an absence of
power in the tribe. It is therefore surprising to find the question of state
power largely addressed in terms of the tribe's sovereign power and whether
that power has been lost by federal regulation, or because it is inconsistent
with the status of the tribe as a domestic dependent nation.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion finds that "tradition simply has not
recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor
regulation by Indians." 5 2 Indeed, Congress had imposed complete prohibition by 1832 and that prohibition lasted into modem times. Her discussion
concludes, "There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians
of any inherent power to regulate in this area." 53 This conclusion is a
puzzling one. It seems to suggest that if Congress repealed all of its laws
about liquor in Indian country, the tribes would be wholly without power to
regulate sales of liquor by Indians on the reservation. The preemption
analysis, more properly directed to the question whether federal policy
informed by notions of Indian sovereignty preempts state law, has been
turned against the tribe. Congressional legislation appears to have preempted the tribe of all inherent or residual power to regulate the subject
matter. Not being traditional, regulation of liquor is not within tribal selfgovernment or any current concept of tribal sovereignty.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Rice, 463 U.S. at 719-20.
See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
Rice, 463 U.S. at 722.
Id. at 724.
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Justice O'Connor even buttresses the preemption analysis she uses
against the tribes by also employing the dependent status doctrine: "the
tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over
liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and as a
54
necessary implication of their dependent status.' ,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, attacked the
majority opinion in Rice on several grounds. First, the preemption analysis
previously adopted by the Court "has never turned on whether the particular
area being regulated is one traditionally within the tribe's control." 55 To
require a tradition of control seems contrary to the federal policy of encouraging tribes to undertake new economic endeavors to support their selfgovernment. The dissent then points out that state authority has usually been
preempted, not because the subject falls within the tribes' traditional powers,
but because federal policy favors freeing the tribes from state control, or
because comprehensive federal regulation preempts the state. 56
This last point illustrates the prime peculiarity of the majority opinion in
Rice v. Rehner. In normal preemption analysis, the strength of the federal
regulation would operate directly toward preempting the state from acting
at all. In Rice v. Rehner, the strength of the federal regulation operates to
deprive the tribe of any power, and thereby indirectly increases the power of
the state to fill the vacuum. Admittedly, this rationale is not the only basis
of decision in Rice v. Rehner; but the expansive and unusual, even distorted, preemption analysis and domestic dependent nation analysis are
fundamental parts of the majority opinion. Both show a potential and a
disposition to narrow greatly the area in which tribes can operate independently of state regulation. The Court's present approach, we must remember, is to balance tribal and state interests. But when the tribes'
inherent authority is whittled down-first, by the requirement that an
activity be "traditional," second, by preemptive effects of strong federal
regulation, and, finally, by notions of additional limitations on tribes
because of their domestic status-the balancing process is far more likely
than before to tip in favor of state regulation.
It is not difficult to see why Indian tribes, surrounded by the superior
sovereignty of the United States, cannot enter treaties with foreign
powers. 57 There is nothing in their status, however, that would keep the
54.
55.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 739.

56.

Id.

57. It is appropriate that tribes lose their foreign relations power to the United States, upon whom
they are dependent. It is not appropriate, however, to limit tribal power because of the tribe's dependent
status when the power is lost to a state, upon whom the tribe is not dependent. That was the result in
Oliphant and Rice v. Rehner.
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tribes from regulating liquor once federal law no longer prohibits liquor to
be sold by tribes or member Indians in Indian country. Possibly some of the
analysis of sovereignty and preemption in Rice v. Rehner will be confined
to the unusual subject of liquor regulation. 5 8 Nothing in its rationale
requires it to be so limited, however. If the same approach is applied to
other areas, Rice v. Rehner will unquestionably signal the beginning of an
accelerated expansion of state authority into the activities of tribes and their
members in Indian country.
D.

Shifting Presumptions:Another Limitation on Tribal Power?

There is one final straw in the wind that I think signifies a possible
change in the assumptions underlying Indian law. One must be very
cautious about this change, because it concerns the canons of construction
of statutes and treaties regarding Indian tribes. Canons of construction are
notoriously subject to manipulation. Nevertheless, some canons have been
consistently applied in the past in Indian cases.
The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that the tribes were at a
disadvantage when they entered treaties with the federal government. The
Court has consequently evolved favorable rules or canons of construction
for Indian treaties. Treaties are to be construed as they were understood by
the tribal representatives who participated in their negotiation. 59 They are
to be liberally interpreted to accomplish their protective purposes, with
ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the Indians. 60 The same sympathetic
construction has been accorded to statutes dealing with Indian matters.
"[S]tatutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians."61
The recent trend which I perceive consists in according decreasing
62
deference to these canons of construction. Montana v. United States,
discussed above, presented a second issue in addition to the question
whether the tribe could regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on nonIndian-owned land. This second question concerned the tribal right of
regulating hunting and fishing founded on the tribe's claim to own the bed
58. Rice refers to the state interest in controlling the "spillover effect" off-reservation ofliquor sold
on the reservation. Rice, 463 U.S. at 724. As Professor Barsh has pointed out, the tribe would have an
equally valid claim on that ground to regulate off-reservation sales by non-Indians. "Spillovers spillover
both ways." Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59
WASH. L. REv. 863, 875 (1984).
59. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
60. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
61. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
62. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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of the Little Big Horn River which flowed through the reservation. In
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,63 the Supreme Court had found in favor of
the Cherokees with regard to a somewhat similar claim in Oklahoma, and
in doing so, relied upon the sympathetic rules for the construction of
treaties. 64 In Montana, however, the Court held that the treaties conveying
to the Crows the land through which the Little Big Horn flowed did not
"overcome the established presumption that the beds of navigable waters
remain in trust for future States and pass to the new States when they
assume sovereignty." 65 The treaty that conveyed lands to the Crows in 1868
did describe the boundaries of the land and gave the Crows the sole right to
66
use and occupy the land. The Court stated:
Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 treaty created, however, its
language is not strong enough to overcome the presumption against the
sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed. The treaty in no way expressly
referred to the riverbed, . . . nor was an intention to convey the river bed
expressed in "clear and especial words," . . . or "definitely declared or
otherwise made very plain" . . . .
While the Montana majority points out significant factual distinctions
between Choctaw and Montana, it nevertheless reversed the normal rules
of sympathetic construction and the presumptions that go with them. The
dissenters, Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
attacked the opinion on that ground.
Three of the Court's most recent statutory cases add to my suspicions. It
is true that in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,67 the Court invoked
the rule of sympathetic construction to hold that the Mineral Leasing Act of
1938 deprived the states of the power, previously granted by federal statute,
to tax non-Indian mining on Indian lands under leases issued pursuant to
the Act. Problematical, however, is Oregon Departmentof Fish & Wildlife
v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 68 in which the question was whether the Klamath
Tribe's agreement to cede lands mistakenly excluded by survey from their
reservation also ceded hunting and fishing rights on those lands. The
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that doubts concerning the
meaning of a treaty with an Indian tribe should be resolved in favor of the
tribe, but it simply disagreed that the cession agreement, which conveyed
"all [the tribe's] claim, right, title and interest" in the lands, or the original
1864 treaty, permitted a sympathetic construction. Justice Marshall, joined
63.
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by Justice Brennan, argued in dissent that such a literal reading ignored the
agreement's historical context, and was "not faithful to the well-established principles that Indian treaties are to be interpreted as they were likely
understood by the tribe and that doubts concerning the meaning of a treaty
should be resolved in favor of the tribe." ' 69 Whether the majority or the
dissent is correct I leave open; there is obviously some point at which the
words of a conveyance control over any canons of construction, but there
are also reasons to doubt that the Indians entering the agreement understood the meaning of "right, title, and interest." They did understand game
and fish and those terms are not mentioned in the cession agreement.
Finally, and the most surprising of all, is MountainStates Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo SantaAna. 70 There, the issue was whether section
17 of the Public Lands Act of 192471 authorized the Pueblo to convey rights
in its lands to private parties, so long as the Secretary of Interior approved.
A right of way had been conveyed long ago to Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company and the tribe claimed that the grant was invalid.
The majority of the court, for whom Justice Stevens wrote, conceded that
the language of section 17 supported both sides. 72 The Court then analyzed
the statute at great length and came to a conclusion adverse to the tribe. The
Court relied in part on the canons of construction that a statute should not
be interpreted in a manner that rendered one part of it inoperative, 73 and
that deference is to be given to the contemporaneous view of the executive
officer charged with administering the statute. 74 Yet, at no point in the
majority opinion of this rather difficult exercise in statutory construction is
there a reference to any of the canons of sympathetic construction favoring
the Indians. Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, took the majority to task for this failure. 75 One gathers that
Justice Stevens, who wrote for the majority both in Santa Ana and
Klamath, finds less guidance than previous courts have in the canons of
sympathetic construction of Indian treaties and statutes. Again, with the
warning that it is always difficult to tell the degree to which canons of
construction are being ignored, we might conclude that future statutory
construction will tilt less towards the interests of the Indians and the tribes
than it has in the past.
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CONCLUSION

I find several evolving modifications in the assumptions traditionally
underlying federal Indian law. The Court no longer relies on the inherent
sovereignty of the tribes to determine the validity of the application of state
law in Indian country. Instead the Court has adopted a preemption analysis
that emphasizes the balancing of state against tribal interests while viewing
tribal interests somewhat narrowly. That approach will permit further
intrusions of state law into Indian country even in instances where tribal
interests are affected. In addition, the Court has displayed willingness to
find further limitations on tribal power derived from their status as domestic dependent nations. Both the preemption approach and the dependent
sovereignty approach are particularly likely to work against the tribe with
regard to novel and nontraditional tribal activities. Finally, there is a
weakening in the application of the canons of construction favorable to the
tribes.
One can sense from these trends a feeling in the air breathed by the tribes
and their counsel that the golden age of litigation has at least temporarily
passed for the tribes. While congressional and presidential policy continues
to favor self-determination, and increased self-sufficiency and self-government by the tribes, 76 the Supreme Court's contemporary posture indicates
that these policies are unlikely to succeed in keeping the tribes free of
interference by state law and state regulation within Indian country. As the
economic activity of the tribes becomes more complex, and the effect of
that activity on state interests becomes more direct, the tribes and the states
will likely have to negotiate mutual accommodations in activities affecting
both Indians and non-Indians in Indian country.
If the tribes and the states are able to negotiate their differences, that is
all to the good. Negotiations, however, are greatly affected by the legal
armament that each side brings to the negotiating table. The danger in the
developing trends of federal Indian law that I have described is that the
tribes' power decreases the more successful the tribes are in freeing
themselves of pervasive federal management and control. At a time when
congressional and presidential policy favor self-determination and selfgovernment, and increasing economic independence and innovation by the
tribes, the current trend of Supreme Court doctrine is counterproductive.

76

See supra notes I and 2 and accompanying text.

